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YES, THE PTAB IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
GREGORY DOLIN, M.D.
INTRODUCTION
In 2011, Congress enacted a major overhaul of the patent laws. While
the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (AIA)1 includes some significant, if
controversial provisions, perhaps the best-known ones are the several administrative processes to review and potentially cancel already issued patents.2
These new post-issuance reviews, specifically the inter partes review (IPR)
have engendered a fair amount of debate in the courts,3 academia,4 and Congress5 with focus being primarily on the procedures used by Patent Trial and
Appeals Board (PTAB)––the newly created adjudicative body within the Patent and Trademark Office, the results of these trials, and the fairness to the
patentees and the challengers.6 There is, however, a more fundamental problem with the PTAB run-post issuance proceedings, one that cannot be cured
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1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (codified in
scattered Sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C. (2012)).
2. See Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 498–99
(2012).
3. See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC. v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2134 (2016); Aqua Prods., Inc.
v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc); Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy
Grp., LLC, 639 F. App’x. 639 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017); MCM Portfolio
LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 292 (2016); Versata
Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
4. See, e.g., Greg Reilly, The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent Cancellation, 23 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 377 (2017); Paul R. Gugliuzza, (In)Valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271 (2016);
John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO As Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657 (2016); Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 719 (2016); Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 881 (2015); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent
Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013); Sarah Tran, Patent Powers,
25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 633 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s Growth and Economic Resilience
(STRONGER) Patents Act of 2017, S. 1390, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017); Protecting American Talent
and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act of 2015, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); Patent Quality
Improvement Act of 2013, S. 866, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
6. See supra notes 3–5.
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by fine-tuning particular processes. The Supreme Court now has before it a
case that will consider whether reposing a power to annul vested private
property rights in an administrative agency runs afoul of the Constitution’s
Article III requirements.7 In this Article, I will lay out a case for why that
question should be answered in the negative.8 In other words, whether the
post-issuance proceedings can or do achieve the Congressional purposes of
reducing patent litigation costs, providing more certainty, and improve patent quality9 is beside the point if the tribunals vested with the review powers
are themselves unconstitutional. The best reading of the Constitutional text,
precedent, and history supports the conclusion that non-judicial abrogation
of vested patent rights does in fact run afoul of the constitutional strictures.
This conclusion is based on the precedents related to both invention patents
and land patents coupled with the original understanding of the Constitutional separation of powers doctrine, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
on the Article III–imposed constraints.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I will discuss the nature of
patents as private property, the judicial treatment patents as on par with property land, and the mechanism for error correction that have existed in light
of these principles. This Part will conclude with an argument as to why patents are not merely private property, but private, rather than public, rights.
Part II will focus on the constitutional requirements for adjudicating private
rights and will reconcile these requirements with ex parte reexamination—
an error correction mechanism that has existed since 1981. In Part III, I will
show that the IPRs do not and cannot live up to the goals and purposes of
Article III, and indeed often are an antithesis of those goals. Finally, Part IV
will offer some suggestions on bringing the system in line with the constitutional requirements. The Conclusion offers some final observations.
I.

PATENTS AS PRIVATE PROPERTY

A. The Treatment of Patents in the Early Republic
As Chief Justice Roberts noted “[in patent law], as other[] [areas], “a
page of history is worth a volume of logic.”10 The examination of the history
of the American patent system yields an unsurprising result. From the early
7. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017).
8. This Article draws heavily on a brief I co-authored in the pending Oil States case. See Brief for
Cato Institute and American Conservative Union Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Oil
States, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (No. 16-1712), 2017 WL 3888212.
9. See Dolin & Manta, supra note 4, at 721–22 (describing goals of the AIA).
10. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
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days of the Republic and to the present day, a long line of cases reaffirmed,
time and again, that patents for inventions are private property and stand on
the same constitutional footing as land.11 This basic understanding has persisted irrespective of the method for obtaining or enforcing patents. This understanding stemmed not merely from a particular statutory provision, but
from the Constitution itself. Chief Justice Marshall explained that
The constitution and law, taken together, give to the
inventor, from the moment of invention, an inchoate property therein, which is completed by suing out a patent. This
inchoate right is exclusive. It can be invaded or impaired by
no person. No person can, without the consent of the inventor, acquire a property in the invention . . . . [T]his inchoate
and indefeasible property in the thing discovered commences with the discovery itself, and is only perfected by
the patent subjecting the future use of the machine constructed previous to a patent . . . .12
It should be acknowledged that the Chief Justice was careful to note
that the exclusivity that comes along with a patent is a creature of congressionally enacted legislation.13 At the same time, the passage is remarkable
for the recognition that the invention itself brings with it a property right,
albeit not an exclusive one, and that that right is conferred not by the government. In other words, the courts had no trouble concluding that inventors
have a pre-existing common law right to their invention which was neither
enlarged nor diminished by the grant of a patent, but that that right was not
exclusive absent a patent grant.14 In light of the influence of John Locke on

11. See generally Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007) (reviewing historical evidence
and concluding that from the early days of the Republic, patents have been treated as private property,
and not merely governmental favors).
12. Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (Marshall, Circuit Justice), aff’d, 13 U.S.
199 (1815).
13. Id. (noting that “the exclusive right to use [the invention] after the date of the patent, [is a right]
which the act of congress [sic] confers”) (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., Patterson v. State of Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 507 (1878) (“The sole operation of the
statute is to enable him to prevent others from using the products of his labors except with his consent.
But his own right of using is not enlarged or affected. There remains in him, as in every other citizen, the
power to manage his property, or give direction to his labors, at his pleasure . . . .”); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (“The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great
Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to
the inventors.”).
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the Founders’ view of government and property,15 this underlying right was
often anchored in the labor of the inventor.16
The Lockean view of invention patents also meant that the early courts
consistently applied the same rules to patents as to real property.17 The clearest example of this can be seen in McClurg v. Kingsland decided in 1843.18
Addressing the effect of amendments to the Patent Act on the rights of those
whose patents issued under the statute previously in force the McClurg Court
held that the amendments “can have no effect to impair the right of property
then existing in a patentee, or his assignee, according to the well-established
principles of this court in 8 Wheat. 493.”19 The citation is noteworthy because the “well-established principles” which the Court referred to were
drawn from a case that had nothing whatsoever to do with patents, but with
land ownership.20 The “well-established principle” announced in that case
was that legislatures cannot derogate from vested land titles21 and the same
rule was applied to patents as well.22 In short, the courts of the early Republic
saw no difference between land grants and invention patent grants.23
This view of patents is particularly noteworthy given that between 1793
and 1836 “patents [were] granted at the patent office, not after an examination into their merits, but upon ex parte statements” of the applicants.24 In
15. See Adam Mossoff, Saving Locke from Marx: The Labor Theory of Value in Intellectual Property Theory, 29 J. SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 283 (2012) (arguing that John Locke’s labor theory of value provides a justification for intellectual property rights); see also Joan E. Schaffner, Patent Preemption Unlocked, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1081, 1100 n.90 (noting that the argument that the framers’ approach to patents
was “influenced by John Locke . . . is particularly persuasive given the strong parallels which can be
drawn between the basic patent structure, Lockean precepts, and the history of the American system.”);
see also David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 421, 426
(1983) (“The framers of the Constitution were men to whom the right to hold property was enormously
important. They were not far removed from Locke. His ideas pervaded their debates and decision.”).
16. See Davoll v. Brown, 7 F. Cas. 197, 199 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Woodbury, Circuit J.) (“[T]he
labors of the mind, productions and interests as much a man’s own, and as much the fruit of his honest
industry, as the wheat he cultivates, or the flocks he rears.”).
17. See Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 2001, 2022 (2009) (“Throughout the nineteenth century, courts employed Lockean property
theory to justify the protection of property rights, especially the new forms of intellectual property.”).
18. 42 U.S. 202 (1843).
19. Id. at 206.
20. See Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S.
464 (1823).
21. Id. at 493.
22. McClurg, 42 U.S. at 206. For a discussion of the case and its interaction with the law governing
real property, see Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property, supra note 11, at 702–03.
23. See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 11, at 700–11; see also Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S.
92, 96 (1876) (“A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right rests on the
same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions.”); McCormick Harvesting
Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman & Co., 169 U.S. 606, 608–09 (1898) (holding that a patent, once signed and
delivered, “become[s] the property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to the same legal protection as
other property.”).
24. Stanley v. Hewitt, 22 F. Cas. 1043, 1044 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1836).

2018

YES, THE PTAB IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

461

other words, the patent office issued a patent upon mere demand for one, and
without conducting an inquiry into the novelty of the invention sought to be
patented. Yet, the courts, though often frustrated with patents that “would
not be capable of sustaining a just claim for the exclusive privileges acquired,”25 continued to recognize patents as property rights, and “construe
these patents fairly and liberally, and not to subject them to any over-nice
and critical refinements.”26
B. Error Correction
None of this is to say that the early patent system was free from error or
that those who crafter and administered that system failed to recognize the
possibility of such error. Quite the opposite. The framers knew that government errors in administering government programs are as old as governments
are themselves.27 The patent system was no different and left plenty of room
for error, so much so that in 1809, the Superintendent of Patents himself
concluded that “many of the patents are useless, except to give work to the
lawyers, & others so useless in construction as to be . . . merely intended for
sale.”28 The judges were no more enamored, writing that “[t]he most frivolous and useless alterations in articles in common use are denominated improvements . . .” and receive patents.29 And the drafters of the Patent Acts
were not so daft as to think that the Government can operate without error.
In the very first Patent Act, Congress provided two avenues to challenge
patent validity.30 First, although a patent served as prima facie evidence of
the patentee’s rights to the things described,31 an accused infringer was permitted to argue that the patent was invalid because it failed to properly specify the thing invented.32 If the defendant managed to overcome the presumption of validity that attached to the patent, the court would be required to
render judgment for the defendant.33 Such judgment for the defendant did
not necessarily “cancel” the patent—it merely resolved a specific dispute
25. John Redman Coxe, Of Patents, 1 EMPORIUM ARTS & SCI. 76, 76 (1812).
26. Ames v. Howard, 1 F. Cas. 755, 756 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833) (Story, Circuit J.).
27. See Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1634–35
(1997); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (rejecting the idea that “the legislature
will [] be infallible.”).
28. Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855, 888 (1998) (quoting Letter from William Thornton, Superintendent, U.S.
Pat. Office, to Amos Eaton (May 5, 1809)).
29. Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1826).
30. Patent Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, §§ 5, 6, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793).
31. Id. at § 6.
32. Id.
33. The defendant could also “plead the general issue,” i.e., argue that the patent was not infringed.
Id.
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between the patentee and a particular defendant.34 However, the 1790 Act
also provided an avenue for outright patent cancellation.35 The Act permitted
a challenge to be brought in a federal district court within a year after the
patent was granted, and if the evidence that the patent was improperly obtained were sufficient, the district judge was empowered “to repeal such patents.”36
The Patent Act of 1793 took a similar approach. Given the switch to a
patent registration system, a patent issued under the 1793 Act would no
longer be prima facie evidence of any rights held by the patentee; rather, the
matter of the patent scope and validity would be resolved at trial “in the circuit court of the United States, or any other court having competent jurisdiction.”37 As before, at trial an accused infringer could argue that the patent
was invalid because it failed to properly specify the thing invented, but in
addition could also attempt to convince the court that the patent described
things that were not “inventions” because they were not “not originally discovered by the patentee, but had been in use, or had been described in some
public work anterior to the supposed discovery.”38 If such a defense were
successful, not only would a “judgment [] be rendered for the defendant,”
but “the patent [would] be declared void.”39 At the same time, the Act preserved the ability of any person to file a suit in a district court for the cancellation of the patent, even in the absence of an infringement suit.40
The 1793 Act, though often viewed as authorizing mere rubber stamping of applications and converting them to full–blown patents,41 actually had
some provisions for (admittedly very limited) administrative review.42 Under
the Act, arbitrators decided competing claims of priority to the same invention.43 In light of elimination of examination process and the abolition of an
34. See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 372 (1888); see also Mowry v. Whitney,
81 U.S. 434, 441 (1871).
35. Patent Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5.
36. Id.
37. Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (repealed 1836). The phrase “or any
other court having competent jurisdiction” seems to imply that at least in the very early days of the Republic, state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction over patent suits. Congress clarified the issue
when it passed the Patent Act of 1800 which omitted the aforementioned phrase, thus limiting patent
litigation to the federal courts. See Donald S. Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REV. 633, 635–36 (1971).
38. Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 6. As before, the defendant could “plead the general
issue,” i.e., non-infringement. Id.
39. Id.
40. The 1793 Act extended the period for cancellation from one year to three. Id. at § 10.
41. See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, Priority of Invention: How the United States Came to Have
A “First-to-Invent” Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263, 306 (1995).
42. See Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 9.
43. Id.
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executive office responsible for making those determinations, creation of a
process for settling these disputes was necessary. Although the 1793 Act
made the judgment or the arbitrators “final,”44 the judgment extended only
“as far as . . . the granting of the patent” to one of the competing applicants.45
The patent could still be judicially cancelled upon petition to the district
court.46 Thus, with respect to granted patents, Congress once again limited
the power of cancellation due to errors in the granting process to Article III
judges. As Thomas Jefferson wrote, the 1793 Act created a system where
patents “issue[d] of course, subject to be declared void on such principles as
should be established by the courts of law.”47
The 1836 Act which brought with it the administrative system of pre–
grant patent examination, authorized the Commissioner of Patents to deny
applications unless the invention described therein was indeed “new.”48 Similarly, the Act allowed the Commissioner to adjudicate the priority rights between interfering patent applications or between a pending application and a
previously issued patent.49 The Commissioner’s decisions on these matters
were also subject to the appeal to the “board of examiners.”50 However, if
the Commissioner decided that a pending application actually had priority of
invention over an issued patent, he was not empowered to cancel the patent.51
Instead, only a court of competent jurisdiction could adjudge that an issued
patent is void and/or that the “applicant [of an interfering application] is [instead] entitled . . . to have and receive a patent for his invention.”52 It was
only after “such adjudication, if it be in favor of the right of such applicant,”

44. Id.
45. Id. The system was not a particularly effective one, as applicants could refuse to participate in
the process, or demand a patent (which the Patent Office was powerless to refuse) even after losing the
arbitration. See Walterscheid, supra note 41, at 309–10.
46. Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 10; Stearns v. Barrett, 22 F. Cas. 1175, 1182 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1816) (Story, Circuit J.) (“The sole object of such an award is, to ascertain who is prima facie
entitled to the patent. But when once obtained, the patent is liable to be repealed or destroyed by precisely
the same process, as if it had issued without objection.”).
47. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 336–37 (Andrew A. Lispcomb et al., eds.) (1903). In later years, Jefferson may
have reconsidered his position and concluded that the “volumes of the law [offer not] a single ray which
would lighten the path of the mechanic or mathematician.” Id. But the point is not whether the judges
succeeded in developing useful rules, but that the drafters of the 1793 Act, much like the drafters of the
1790 Act thought that once granted (on whatever terms), a patent could only “be declared void on such
principles as should be established by the courts of law.” Id.
48. Patent Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (repealed 1952).
49. Id. at § 8.
50. Id. at §§ 7, 8.
51. See Ewing v. U.S. ex rel. Fowler Car Co., 45 App. D.C. 185, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1916); see also
Reilly, supra note 4, at 387.
52. Patent Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 16.
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would the “Commissioner [be authorized] to issue [a] patent” to an interfering applicant.53
Although “[t]he 1836 Patent Act did not include a specific private cause
of action for . . . cancellation for fraud or inequitable conduct,”54 it continued
to authorize defendants in patent suits to challenge patent validity as a defense to any infringement action brought against them. 55 If the defendant
were to convince a court that the patent was indeed invalid, he would escape
liability for infringement,56 but (and unlike the prior practice) the patent
“would remain a valid instrument as to all others.”57 Additionally, the courts,
as a matter of equity, remained able to cancel improperly issued patents, provided that the suit was brought by the United States itself rather than a private
party.58 It “is notable . . . that in all [] circumstances in which a party (public
or private) sought to annul or revoke a patent under the 1836 Act, that party
had to proceed in equity.”59 And because equity power is vested solely in
Article III tribunals and cannot be withdrawn from them by Congress,60 patent invalidation under the 1836 Act could be accomplished only through
Article III judicial intervention.
As Congress continued to refine the system with subsequent Patent
Acts, it continued to strengthen the power of the Patent Office to separate
applications worthy of a patent from those unworthy of the same. At the same
time, Congress never wavered from leaving the adjudication of issued patents’ validity to the courts.
Because the courts have consistently recognized that “[a] patent for an
invention is as much property as a patent for land . . . [t]he right rests on the
same foundation . . . surrounded and protected by the same sanctions,”61 it is
worth examining how the courts dealt with mistakes in the grant of land patents. The Homestead Act62 was a near contemporary of the Patent Act of
1836, being signed into law a mere quarter of a century later. The land patents received under the Homestead Act, are nearly a mirror image of patents
received under the Patent Act. While the Homestead Act was in effect, settlers found empty lots of land, worked the land for five years, and then filed
53.
54.
(2013).
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1699
See Patent Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, §§ 12, 15.
Id. at § 15.
Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 434, 441 (1871).
Id.; United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 360 (1888).
Lemley, supra note 54, at 1702.
Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855).
Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876).
Act of May 20, 1862 (Homestead Act), ch. 75, §§ 1–2, 12 Stat. 392 (1862).
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an application for a patent from the federal government.63 In other words,
settlers found land that wasn’t known to others before, made it into new and
useful farmland, and upon disclosure of their efforts received, pursuant to a
statute, a document that allowed them to exclude all others from the land
which the settlers made theirs. The process for obtaining a patent for invention under the 1836 Act (and subsequent legislation) was and is strikingly
similar. An inventor discovers an idea not previously known to others, develops that idea into a new and useful invention, and upon the disclosure of
that invention, receives a document that allows him to exclude others from
working his invention, pursuant to a statute.64
The complaints about land patents mirrored the views that “[a] considerable portion of all the patents granted [for inventions] are worthless and
void.”65 Indeed, “[t]he head of the U.S. General Land Office, the agency
which disbursed federal lands, estimated that in 1883 fraud accounted for 40
percent of the 5-year homesteads,”66 which in turn caused much pressure to
rescind or cancel these grants.67 And while there were attempts to simply
cancel such grants administratively,68 the Supreme Court was clear that once
The patent issued under the seal of the United States,
and signed by the President, is delivered to and accepted by
the party, the title of the government passes with this delivery. With the title passes away all authority or control of the
Executive Department over the land, and over the title which
it has conveyed.69
The rule applied with equal force to patents that were issued following
a mistake on law or fact, and even to patents obtained by outright fraud.70
Such patents could only be cancelled as a result of “a direct proceeding instituted by the government or by parties acting in its name and by its
63. Id. at § 2; see also Getting to Know the Homestead Act, NAT’L PARK SVC., http://bit.ly/2w8dyz0
(last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
64. See Patent Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102–03,
111–14 (1952).
65. S. REP. NO. 24-239, at 2 (1836), available at http://perma.cc/HX7S-33GK.
66. GEORGE DRAFFAN, TAKING BACK OUR LAND: A HISTORY OF RAILROAD LAND GRANT
REFORM 3 (1998), http://www.landgrant.org/takingback.pdf.
67. See generally id. (discussing political pressure to deal with improperly issued grants of land).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 (1880) (a mandamus petition was brought after
the Commissioner of the General Land-Office refused to deliver and attempted to cancel a previously
signed and sealed patent).
69. Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 533 (1877).
70. Wright-Blodgett Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 397, 403 (1915).
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authority.”71 Additionally, a private party whose interest clashed with the
land patent could also sue and, upon proof that the government made a mistake, could seek an order from “a court of equity to correct the mistake and
compel the transfer of the legal title to him as the true owner.”72
The Court treated invention patents in exactly the same way, usingnearly identical language. Thus, McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v.
Aultman73—an invention patent case—decided in 1898 nearly parroted the
language of Moore v. Robbins74—a land patents cases—decided two decades
earlier. The McCormick Court did not view it as controversial to observe that
once “a patent has received the signature of the secretary of the interior,
countersigned by the commissioner of patents, and has had affixed to it the
seal of the patent office, it has passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of
that office, and is not subject to be revoked or canceled by the president, or
any other officer of the government.”75
Some scholars and judges have cast doubt on the vitality or applicability
of McCormick to the modern Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) practices
arguing that it did not announce a constitutional rule but merely interpreted
the then-existing Patent Act.76 However, such an argument ignores the
McCormick Court’s reliance on U.S. v. Schurz.77 In that case, a settler demanded that a land patent, which had been signed and sealed, be delivered
to him.78 The Secretary of the Interior instead ordered them cancelled.79
When sued in mandamus, the Secretary argued that in deciding whether to
deliver the patent he
was called upon to exercise a judgment and discretion
on the case presented to him which were not merely ministerial, but which were rather judicial in their character, and
in regard to which many matters were to be considered,—
71. Lee v. Johnson, 116 U.S. 48, 49 (1885).
72. Id.
73. 169 U.S. 606 (1898).
74. 96 U.S. 530 (1877).
75. 169 U.S. at 608. Compare id., with 96 U.S. at 533 (When “the patent [is] issued under the seal
of the United States, and signed by the President, is delivered to and accepted by the party, the title of the
government passes with this delivery. With the title passes away all authority or control of the Executive
Department over the land, and over the title which it has conveyed. . . . [T]here is no place for the further
control of the Executive Department over the title. The functions of that department necessarily cease
when the title has passed from the government.”).
76. See Reilly, supra note 4, at 393–94; see also MCM Portfolio, LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812
F.3d 1284,1288–91. (Fed. Cir. 2015).
77. United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 378 (1880).
78
. Id.
79
. Id.
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such as the validity of the title conferred by the patent, the
circumstances under which it was signed, sealed, and recorded, and the conflicting rights of other parties to the lands
covered by it.80
According to the Secretary, the “execution of the patent concluded
nothing, and the authority of the Secretary . . . to deal with the whole subject . . . remained unaffected by the patent.”81 Although the Supreme Court
began its analysis of the Secretary’s argument by an observation that its
soundness “must depend upon the authority conferred by Congress”82 on the
Secretary, the opinion itself analyzed no statutory law,83 but instead relied
on English common law as explicated by Blackstone.84 The Court’s reliance
on English common law, as well as “all [other] nations, as far as we know”85
would be rather peculiar if all it was doing was deciding upon the scope of
the statutory limits upon the Secretary’s powers. A much more likely conclusion was that the Court was addressing a constitutional requirement that
once something has become an individual’s private property, the instrument
upon which such claim rests, may be voided “not by arbitrarily
WITHHOLDING IT, but by judicial proceedings to set it aside, or correct it
if only partly wrong.”86 The Court ultimately held that once a land patent is
signed and sealed, the title has vested in the patentee and the executive
branch can do nothing to divest him of such title though it may have doubts
about the propriety of the initial grant of the patent.87 The only avenue of
setting such a patent aside would be by a suit in equity,88 adjudication of
which is necessarily reserved to the courts.89 Given the citation to Schurz,
80. Id. at 395.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. The Court did discuss the statute insofar as it authorized Executive Branch officials to initially
dispose of the federal lands and their authority to adjudicate various claims to the same. Id. at 395–96.
Conspicuously though, the Court nowhere mentioned that the reason the Secretary of the Interior was not
empowered to cancel an already issued patent was for want of explicit statutory authorization of such a
power. Instead, the Court focused on the nature of the right in the claimant once the patent has issued,
concluding that in those circumstances “the title to the lands has passed from the government [and] the
question as to the real ownership of them is open in the proper courts to all the considerations appropriate
to the case.” Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 397–98.
85. Id. at 402.
86. Id. at 401–02 (capitalization in the original).
87. Id. at 397, 400–02.
88. Id. at 404 (“[W]hen [a claimant] obtains this possession [via an issued patent], if there be any
equitable reason why, as against the government, he should not have it,—if it has been issued without
authority of law, or by mistake of facts, or by fraud of the grantee,—the United States can, by a bill in
chancery, have a decree annulling the patent, or possibly a writ of scire facias.”).
89. Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855).
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and the nature of that case, it is more likely that McCormick was decided not
only on statutory grounds.
The only 19th-century precedent that potentially stands athwart this understanding is Morgan v. Daniels,90 decided in 1894. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Commissioner of Patents’ determination on the
question of who is the “true” first inventor is conclusive “unless the contrary
is established by testimony which in character and amount carries thorough
conviction.”91 This has been taken by some to mean that the Patent Office
could, in an interference proceeding, administratively cancel a patent issued
to one party and transfer it to another.92 Except that no case appears to hold
that.93 Indeed, the only authority relied on for support of that proposition is
Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.—a case where
in litigation between two interfering patents, the District Court relied for the
part of its conclusion on the interference proceedings in the Patent Office.94
That case, however, cannot withstand the weight assigned to it.
Victor Talking had a somewhat convoluted litigation history. It began
when the Patent Office issued a patent relating “to a talking machine with
the mechanical parts enclosed in a cabinet”95 to one Johnson.96 Thereafter,
Browning filed a patent application covering the same invention.97 In an interference proceeding, the Commissioner decided the interference in favor
of Johnson, the senior party.98 On an appeal by Browning, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (itself an Article III tribunal) reversed and
found that Browning was the first inventor with Johnson deriving his invention from Browning.99 It is at this point though that a noteworthy event occurred. Complying with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Patent Office issued a patent to Browning.100 However, it took no action against
Johnson’s earlier patent, which resulted in two interfering patents.101 The assignors of the two interfering patents then engaged in further litigation over
90. 153 U.S. 120 (1894).
91. Id. at 125.
92. See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 4, at 394.
93. Morgan involved a suit stemming from the Patent Office’s adjudication of interfering applications. 153 U.S. at 120. In resolving this dispute, the Court didn’t deviate from the rule laid down in land
patent cases. Id. at 124–25 (citing Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. 72, 86 (1871)).
94. 290 F. 565 (D. Del. 1923), aff’d, 8 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1925), aff’d sub nom. Victor Talking Mach
Co v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 273 U.S. 670 (1927).
95. Browning v. Johnson, 271 F. 1017, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1921).
96. U.S. Patent No. 946,442 (issued Jan. 11, 1910).
97. 271 F. at 1017–18; see also Victor Talking, 290 F. at 572.
98. 290 F. at 572.
99. Browning, 271 F. at 1019.
100. U.S. Patent No. 1,402,738 (issued Jan. 10, 1922).
101. Victor Talking, 290 F. at 565.
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their rights.102 In adjudicating the Victor Talking matter, the District Court
explained that while the Commissioner may adjudicate the issues of priority,
it does not affect issued patents directly,103 but may be used as evidence to
later invalidate them in a suit at equity.104 The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was to be treated the same way due to the
limited nature of appeal to that court from adverse interferences decisions.105
Because of these limitations on the Patent Office, it was left to the District
Court, sitting in equity, to enter a final order invalidating Johnson’s patent.106
On closer inspection then, Victor Talking is an entirely unremarkable case.
Though the District Court deferred to the Patent Office’s (and Court of Appeal’s) fact-finding, it still was open to new evidence and at the end of the
day evaluated all of the evidence prior to arriving at the conclusion that the
earlier judgment ought not be disturbed.107 Nothing in Victor Talking serves
to undermine the conclusion that in the 19th century the courts viewed issued
patents as indistinguishable from other forms of property and required that
any doubts about their validity be resolved in properly constituted Article III
tribunals.
C. Patents as Private Rights
Admittedly, the 19th century precedents cannot fully resolve the question of PTAB’s constitutionality. Although the Patent Office (along with
other agencies existing in the 1800s) were certainly “administrative agencies,”108 the administrative state as presently understood did not fully blossom until mid-20th century.109 With the development of the administrative
state and the proliferation of various agencies with power to adjudicate all
sorts of disputes, a new legal framework came into being.110 The Supreme
Court began to draw a distinction between the type of rights that could be
adjudicated in tribunals other than Article III courts, and the rights for which
102. Id.
103. Id. at 575 (noting that the Court of Appeals, like the Patent Office, “had before it only the
question of priority of invention and matters subordinate and pertinent thereto. This court is not so restricted. It may determine whether either of the patents is void on any ground.”).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 568–59 (quoting Johnson v. Mueser, 212 U.S. 283, 284 (1909)).
106. Id. at 575. The District Court also invalidated, under the equitable doctrine of laches, Browning’s interfering claim. Id.
107. Id. at 572–74.
108. See Michael J. Pender, Judicial Review of PTO Patentability: Determinations Under the Substantial Evidence Standard of Review, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 431, 434 n.17 (2000).
109. See Peter E. Quint, What Is A Twentieth-Century Constitution?, 67 MD. L. REV. 238, 246
(2007).
110. Id. (“When the ‘administrative state’ began its impressive rise . . . [it] relied . . . on a proliferation of statutory solutions.”).
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no substitute to an Article III tribunal would do.111 The former are known as
“public rights,” while the latter are “private rights.”112 Unfortunately, both
the nomenclature and the jurisprudence underlying the distinction is not, by
the Court’s own admission, a model of clarity.113 Nonetheless, some lines
(albeit not incontestable) could be drawn.
Generally speaking, a right is classified as “private” when it “encompasses the type of property that is treated as compensable under the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment if taken.”114 On the other hand, a right is
“public” when “the deprivation . . . would trigger [only] procedural due process protections.”115 As other commentators and I have argued, patents are
(and have always been) subject to the Takings Clause protections.116 Courts
have recognized this requirement for over 100 years.117 Thus in Cammeyer
v. Newton, the Court held that “the government cannot, after the patent is
issued, make use of the improvement any more than a private individual,
without license of the inventor or making him compensation.” Nor has the
Court retreated from this position in recent years. Just two terms ago, the
Court in Horne v. Dep’t of Agriculture reaffirmed that personal property,
including patents, is constitutionally no different than real property.118 And
while it is true that merely investing some right with attributes of property
does not make that right “private,”119 for many such rights (e.g., EPA licenses, welfare payments, government employment, and the like) are

111. See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 318 U.S. 163 (1943); see also NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); see
also Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
112. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50–51.
113. See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1964–68 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the confusion in the doctrine); see also Mila Sohoni, Agency Adjudication and Judicial Nondelegation: An Article III Canon, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1569, 1584 (2013) (“Any candid discussion
of th[e] subject [of public and private rights] must acknowledge at the outset that the cases on Article III
and the public–private line are a confusing morass.”).
114. Sohoni, supra note 113, at 1156.
115. Id.
116. See Dolin & Manta, supra note 4, at 772–80; see also Mossoff, Constitutional Private Property,
supra note 11, at 700–11; see also Joshua I. Miller, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(A) and the Unconstitutional Taking
of Patents, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 18 (2010–2011).
117. See, e.g., James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882) (A patent “confers upon the patentee
an exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used by the government
itself, without just compensation, any more than it can appropriate or use without compensation land
which has been patented to a private purchaser.”).
118. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S.
356 (1882)).
119. See Sohoni, supra note 113, at 1156.
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protected only by the Due Process Clause,120 patent rights, being protectable
under the Takings Clause121 do fit within the “private” rights silo.122
On the other hand, the Takings Clause analysis is not the only one the
Court has used to differentiate between public and private rights.123 Another
test is to consider whether the right in question is asserted against the government or against a private individual.124 Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the government is immune from suit, and therefore no Article III
questions can arise.125 The government, of course, can and does waive that
immunity so as to allow citizens to vindicate their rights including by monetary compensation.126 At the same time, when the government does waive
its immunity, it can condition the waiver on disputes being adjudicated in
non-Article III tribunals.127 Thus, under traditional view, “the presence of the
United States as a proper party . . . is a necessary but not sufficient means of
distinguishing ‘private rights’ from ‘public rights.’”128 In other words, public
rights are “those which arise between the Government and persons subject
120. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); see also Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 532 (1985); see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
564 (1972); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255 (1970).
121. See supra notes 114–116 and accompanying text.
122. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law As Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 41 (2012)
(“Patent litigation historically has been regarded as private law litigation, meaning ‘disputes between
private parties about private rights.’”) (quoting Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976)); Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson Am., Inc., 864 F.3d
1309, 1316, 1323–25 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Reyna, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). But see
MCM Portfolio, LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[P]atent rights are
public rights”).
123. See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 585–89 (rejecting “a bright-line test for determining” the dividing line
between public and private rights).
124. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982) (plurality opinion) (“[A] matter of public rights must at a minimum arise ‘between the government and others.’”) (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)); see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51
(1932) (“[T]he distinction is at once apparent between cases of private right and those which arise between the government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the
constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments. . . . Familiar illustrations of administrative agencies created for the determination of such matters are found in connection with the exercise
of the congressional power as to interstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands,
public health, the facilities of the post office, pensions, and payments to veterans.”).
125. Hans v. La., 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.”); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 577 (1933)
(holding that Hans “applies with equal force to suits against a state and those brought against the United
States.”).
126. See, e.g., Tucker Act of 1887, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2011).
127. Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 452 (holding that “claimants [against the government] have [no] right to
sue on [their claims] unless Congress consents; and Congress may attach to its consent such conditions
as it deems proper, even to requiring that the suits be brought in a legislative court specially created to
consider them.”).
128. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69
(1982)).
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to its authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative departments.”129 Under this view, the vast
majority of patent disputes are indeed disputes over private rights, for they
are disputes between private parties.130 (There are occasionally infringement
suits between private parties and the federal government, and those can be
and are properly assigned to the Court of Federal Claims—an Article I
court).131 The IPRs are, by every measure, disputes between private parties132
with the government officials acting only as adjudicators.133 On the traditional view of the fault line between public and private rights, then, patent
disputes between private parties fall squarely in the latter camp.
A third way the courts have differentiated between public and private
rights is by assigning to the former category those rights that are “closely
intertwined with a federal regulatory program Congress has power to enact”134 and are “so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to
be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by
the Article III judiciary.”135 It is not disputable that Congress has the power,
not an obligation to enact patent laws setting forth the scope, duration, and
other aspect of patent rights.136 But it does not follow that the grant of patents
is a regulatory scheme as that term was understood in Granfinanciera and
Thomas v. Union Carbide. Patent laws are unlike the regulatory schemes for
selling drugs or pesticides. Those schemes could readily be classified as regulatory because government deployed quintessential police powers to control what items enter the market and under what conditions.137 In contrast,
129. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 452
(1977).
130. See La Belle, supra note 122, at 41; see also Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 65 (concluding that
only suits that are “between the government and others” implicate “public rights.”).
131. See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
132. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012) (allowing “a person who is not the owner of a patent [to] file
with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent.”); id. at § 314(a) (prohibiting
the PTO Director from instituting an IPR unless a petition has been filed and has met certain threshold
requirements).
133. Id. at §§ 316(c), 318(a).
134. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54.
135. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593 (1985).
136. See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843) (“[T]he powers of Congress to legislate
upon the subject of patents is plenary . . . and . . . there can be no limitation of their right to modify them
at their pleasure, so that they do not take away the rights of property in existing patents.”); see also In re
Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958–59 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“It is to be observed that the Constitutional clause under
consideration neither gave to nor preserved in inventors (or authors) any rights and set no standards for
the patentability of individual inventions; it merely empowered Congress, if it elected to do so, to secure
to inventors an ‘exclusive right’ for an unstated ‘limited’ time for the stated purpose of promoting useful
arts.”).
137. Compare Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 992–93 (1984) (“Monsanto has not
challenged the ability of the Federal Government to regulate the marketing and use of pesticides. Nor
could Monsanto successfully make such a challenge, for such restrictions are the burdens we all must
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the grant of patents is not done pursuant to police powers and does not regulate the ability of the patentee to place products on the market.138 Instead, it
grants the patent holder nothing more than a right to exclude others from his
property,139 questions of patent validity are questions of private party’s ability to exclude others from his property.140 In this sense, patent laws are no
different than the Homestead Act where the government had the power to
transfer property belonging to the United States and to create detailed rules
for such transfer, but where the rights created following such transfer were
“private” rights.141 Nor is it different from a trademark—a species of intellectual property that the Court has found to be a private right.142 None of it
is surprising, as “[t]he hallmark of a protected property interest is the right
to exclude others. That is ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property.’”143
For the same reason, the oft-advanced argument that patents are public
rights because they are creatures of a statute is also not convincing. As discussed in the preceding Part, rights in land are also often traceable to a statutory enactment.144 Indeed, according to the National Park Service, private
bear in exchange for ‘the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community.’” (quoting
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979)), with Leatherman Tool Grp. Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 131
F.3d 1011, 1014–15 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[W]hile the patent laws provide the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling a claimed invention . . . [they] do not create any affirmative right to make, use,
or sell anything.”).
138. In fact, both state and federal governments may outright prohibit the sale or possession of patented devices. See, e.g., Webber v. Va., 103 U.S. 344, 347 (1880); see also Patterson v. Ky., 97 U.S.
501, 505–09 (1878).
139. See Leatherman Tool, Grp. Inc., 131 F.3d at 1014–15.
140. See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 147 (2013) (“A valid patent excludes all except its
owner from the use of the protected process or product . . . . But an invalidated patent carries with it no
such right.”) (emphasis in original; internal citations and quotations omitted). It is this distinction that
makes IPRs fundamentally different from non-Article III adjudication system approved in Thomas. There,
the regulatory scheme did not deprive a private party from its right to exclude others from its private
property. Rather, the government required disclosure of certain data in order to obtain a permit to market
the pesticides. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007–08. The disclosures were entirely voluntary. Id. To the
extent those data constituted trade secrets (undoubtedly private property), the right to exclude others was
“extinguished” by the voluntary disclosure. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584. Thus, once disclosure was made,
the manufacturer lost the right to exclude. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1011–12. The only thing left to the
manufacturers of pesticides was a right to be compensated for competitors’ use of their data. Thomas,
473 U.S. at 574–75. This right of compensation is a right wholly apart from the right to exclude. Cf. id.
at 590 (noting that Congress could have instead of creating an arbitration regime, simply required fees
for usage of others’ data and then redistributed those fees to the data providers); Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S.
at 1011 (“With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the very definition of the
property interest.”). The only right which Congress assigned to a non-Article III tribunal was the right to
compensation. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 590.
141. See supra notes 62–72 and accompanying text.
142. K–Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185–186 (1988) (“Trademark law, like contract
law, confers private rights, which are themselves rights of exclusion.”).
143. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999)
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
144. Id.

474

CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Vol 17:2

property in 10 percent of all the land in the United States, spread across 30
states, exists solely by virtue of the Homestead Act.145 Yet, without a doubt,
the rights in that land are indeed private rights.146
While the line between private and public rights is no longer as bright
as it briefly was, both history and the fundamental difference between patents
and other benefits acquired as part of pervasive regulatory schemes suggest
that patents belong in the former rather than latter category.
II.

ADJUDICATING PRIVATE RIGHTS
A. Article III and Private Rights

Even in cases where the right in question is indisputably “private,” nothing precludes courts from seeking independent expert reports and recommendations.147 Courts often appoint “special masters” to resolve complex
disputes. Federal judges heavily rely on magistrate judges to supervise litigation between private parties.148 Why can’t then federal courts rely on the
expertise of the Patent Office to resolve often difficult questions of patent
validity? The short answer is they can, and probably should,149 but with a
major caveat. When the courts appoint special masters or employ magistrate
judges, they retain the power of plenary review of the proposed

145. NAT’L PARK SVC., supra note 63.
146. Furthermore, it is not even beyond debate that patent rights stem from the statute rather than
inhere in the inventor by the virtue of the Constitution itself. As Chief Justices Marshall and Taney wrote,
the inventor has, from the moment of the invention an inchoate property right which is merely “perfected”
and “made absolute” by suing out a patent. See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 493 (1850) (Taney, C.J.)
(“[T]he discoverer of a new and useful improvement is vested by law with an inchoate right to its exclusive use, which he may perfect and make absolute by proceeding in the manner which the law requires.”);
Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (Marshall, Circuit Justice), aff’d, 13 U.S. 199
(1815). Whether one sides with Taney and Marshall or whether one adopts a more restrictive view of
patent rights, the important point is that the mere fact that a particular right flows from a statute does not
ipso facto make that right a “public” one.
147. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (“In cases of equity and admiralty, it is historic
practice to call to the assistance of the courts, without the consent of the parties, masters, and commissioners or assessors, to pass upon certain classes of questions, as, for example, to take and state an account
or to find the amount of damages.”); see also Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV.
275, 311 (2010) (noting that courts, though “only occasionally [rely on] special masters and outside experts.”).
148. United States v. Hollingsworth, 783 F.3d 556, 565 (5th Cir. 2015) (Higginson, J., dissenting)
(“As assistants, the federal magistracy is an Article III adjunct body—joining in aid, indispensably and
even magisterially”); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1984)
(“District courts and, occasionally, appellate courts are accustomed to deferring to non-Article III officials
acting as factfinders. Examples include . . . special masters and magistrates”).
149. See Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the Hindsight
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1463 (2006).
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recommendations.150 The same is not true when it comes to IPRs. 151 This is
what sets IPRs apart from other non-Article III adjudications, and even pre–
existing reexamination proceedings.
As is the case with most executive tribunals, a dissatisfied party can
appeal PTAB’s IPR rulings to federal courts.152 The Supreme Court has previously held that the right to appeal may satisfy the requirements of Article
III.153 Thus, in Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co. where the
Court held that initial administrative adjudication of state law issue is permissible provided there is review in an Article III court, even if the review is
very limited in scope.154 Similarly, in Crowell v. Benson, the Court permitted
an administrative agency to perform fact-finding subject only to judicial review on questions of law.155 Several decades later, in Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, the Court endorsed administrative resolution of
state law claims (which are usually heard by an Article III court) where such
resolution was consented to by the parties.156 At first glance, these cases seem
to support the constitutionality of PTAB. After all, a patent owner maintains
the right to appeal an unfavorable decision to the Federal Circuit, which reviews questions of law de novo.157 However, upon a deeper examination, the
argument fails.
In all of the cases just discussed, the right at issue was, though a private
right,158 of a particular nature. It was either a bankruptcy or an admiralty
right, or, as in Schor, a right that was freely surrendered to the adjudication
of an Article I tribunal. To put it simply, the nature of the claim matters.
Admiralty and bankruptcy have long been recognized as different from common law cases and it is on these grounds that the Supreme Court approved
150. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (2012); Thornton v. Jennings, 819 F.2d 153, 154 (6th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (“Article III of the Constitution require that the district court make a de novo review of the magistrate’s report and recommendations); see also Stauble v. Warrob, Inc., 977 F.2d 690, 696 (1st Cir. 1992)
(holding that “refer[ing] the entire case to a special master for findings of fact and conclusions of law,
with no boundaries on the master’s authority and no provision for anything remotely resembling de novo
review.”).
151. See Merck & Cie v. Gnosis S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“In appeals of Board
decisions, these factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.”).
152. 35 U.S.C. § 329 (2012). In the post-issuance review this right is not fully reciprocal. A patent
challenger may not appeal an adverse finding unless they would have an independent standing in an
Article III court (a requirement not imposed in the PTAB proceedings). See Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen,
Inc., 845 F.3d 1168, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
153. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 78–79 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (“[T]his Court has sustained the use of adjunct factfinders even in the adjudication of constitutional rights—so long as those adjuncts were subject to sufficient control by an Art. III district court.”).
154. 318 U.S. at 170–71.
155. 285 U.S. 22, 51–54 (1932).
156. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986).
157. 35 U.S.C. § 329 (2011); see also Corning v. Fast Felt Corp., 873 F.3d 896, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
158. Bankers Trust, 318 U.S. at 168; Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51; Schor, 478 U.S. at 850.
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factual dispute resolution before Article I adjudicators.159 Similarly, it is permissible to have private parties resolve their claims before whatever body
they see fit, provided that they agree to do so. And, of course, using adjuncts
such as special masters or magistrate judges does not undermine the ultimate
authority of Article III courts to resolve disputes over private rights provided
that “Article III courts control the [adjunct] system as a whole.”160 In contrast, the power to resolve traditional common law disputes cannot be removed from Article III courts (and their “adjuncts.”).161
Properly viewed then, the Supreme Court’s precedents do not buttress,
but rather undermine PTAB’s constitutional footing. The judicial supervision of PTAB is simply insufficient to comport with Article III requirements.
PTAB “issue[s] final judgments, which are binding and enforceable even in
the absence of an appeal,”162 and its factual findings are reviewed under the
“deferential [substantial evidence] standard.”163 Indeed, even questions of
law are not entirely reviewable on appeal.164 For example, unlike in Crowell,
where the Court held that the existence of jurisdictional facts triggering the
administrative adjudicatory process must be subject to plenary review in Article III courts,165 the AIA expressly prohibits judicial review of the PTAB’s
decision to institute an IPR in the first place.166 Additionally, the courts defer
to the PTAB’s claim construction standard,167 even though the proper scope

159. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51 (“In cases of equity and admiralty, it is historic practice to call to
the assistance of the courts, without the consent of the parties, masters, and commissioners or assessors,
to pass upon certain classes of questions, as, for example, to take and state an account or to find the
amount of damages.”); Bankers Trust, 318 U.S. at 170 (“[C]ourts of equity, of admiralty and of bankruptcy, by themselves and their mandatories examine and decide disputed questions of fact; and no reason
is perceived why claims of the sort here involved should not be litigated, as are other claims against
bankrupt estates, by such machinery and in such manner as Congress shall prescribe, saving to the claimant the right of notice and hearing, and such review as is provided by the statute as we construe it.”).
160. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 544–46 (9th
Cir.) (en banc) (Kennedy, J.).
161. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–503 (2011).
162. Id. at 486–87 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85–86
(1982) (plurality opinion)).
163. N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 85 (plurality opinion). Indeed, the Federal Circuit upholds
PTAB’s factual determinations when supported by “substantial evidence,” see Merck & Cie v. Gnosis
S.P.A., 808 F.3d 829, 833 (Fed. Cir. 2015)—a more deferential standard than the review of Bankruptcy
Judges’ determinations disapproved of in Northern Pipeline and Stern. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S.
150, 162–63 (1999).
164. See infra notes 166–168.
165. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62–65 (1932).
166. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016).
But see Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc) (holding
that courts can review whether the PTAB complied with the time bar provisions of the statute in its institution decisions).
167. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2142–46.
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of the claim is a question of law.168 The Supreme Court rejected a similar
scheme concerning bankruptcy judges,169 and there is no good reason to think
that patent judges are any different.
B. Reconciling the Private Rights Doctrine with Reexamination
Inter Partes Review is not the first Congressional attempt to give the
Patent Office power to take a “second look” at issued patents.170 The first
such mechanism was adopted in 1980 when Congress created ex parte reexamination.171 Without going into great details of the reexamination process,
suffice it to say, that once a petition for reexamination was granted, “the
[reexamination] process unfolds just like the original examination of a patent
application would . . . .” In essence, it would be fair to say that for the purposes of evaluating the continuing patentability of claims subject to reexamination, the issued patent is treated as a mere patent application.172 So the
question then is whether IPRs are in any meaningful way different from the
ex parte reexaminations. The answer to that question is “yes.” And they are
different in a constitutionally significant way.
In contrasting IPRs with ex parte reexaminations, I shall not retread
ground that I have covered elsewhere beyond noting that the rights of the
patentees in IPRs are narrower than in ex parte reexamination.173 More significant though, are the avenues of appeal open to a patentee whose patent
was invalidated in ex parte reexamination. Prior to the America Invents Act,
an unsatisfied patent owner whose patent was cancelled, had a statutory right
to either seek review in the Federal Circuit (under the traditional deferential
review standards),174 or institute a civil action in the U.S. District Court
168. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 842 (2015) (“[t]he ultimate question
of construction [is] a legal question.”).
169. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 486 (2011) (“A full majority of Justices in Northern Pipeline
also rejected the debtor’s argument that the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction was constitutional
because the bankruptcy judge was acting merely as an adjunct of the district court or court of appeals.”).
170. See generally Dolin, supra note 4, at 890–95, 899–909 (discussing the history of “second look”
proposals and legislation).
171. Id. at 890; Act of December 12, 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act), Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 30, § 302, 94
Stat. 3015, 3015 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 302).
172. Dolin, supra note 4, at 901.
173. See generally id. (discussing differences between IPRs and various forms of reexamination
proceedings).
174. See 35 U.S.C. § 306 (2002) (“The patent owner involved in a reexamination proceeding . . .
may seek court review under the provisions of sections 141 to 145 of this title . . . .”). Sections 141 through
144 govern appeals to the Federal Circuit, while Section 145 allowed “[a]n applicant dissatisfied with the
decision of the Board [to] have remedy by civil action against the Director in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.” See also In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (reviewing PTO’s decisions on reexamination under the “substantial evidence” standard).
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(under a de novo) review standard.175 This ability to seek de novo review is
what made the old process constitutionally permissible.176 Under such rules,
the patent judges truly served as mere adjuncts to the Article III judiciary.177
In 1999, the right of review in District Court was purportedly eliminated.178 Admittedly, the statute allowing such review was not a model of
clarity (in large part because the terminology was not updated when Congress created ex parte reexamination),179 which in turn allowed the Patent
Office to interpret it in a restrictive fashion.180 Although a few District Court
decisions supported the PTO’s statutory interpretation that no District Court
review of reexamination decisions is available181, it is far from clear that such
an interpretation is correct.182 In any event, the elimination of the right to
seek de novo review of a reexamination decision is of much more recent
vintage than the creation of the reexamination process itself. Thus, the addition of this procedure to the Patent Act in 1980 tells us nothing about the
constitutionality of IPRs created in 2012.
A harder case to distinguish is inter partes reexamination which was
created in 1999183 and abolished with the passage of the AIA.184 The inter
partes reexamination was in all respects identical to an ex parte reexamination (and therefore initial examination) but for the fact that it allowed continued participation of a third party which requested the proceedings in the
first place.185 Under the statute that created inter partes reexamination, a dissatisfied party was permitted to appeal an unfavorable decision only to the
175. In an action under § 145, the review is de novo and introduction of new evidence is permitted.
See Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431, 444–46 (2012).
176. See supra notes 150, 153 and accompanying text.
177. The same analysis also applies to the even older procedures for interferences between applications and already issued patents. A patentee whose claims have been administratively cancelled in an
interference proceeding had a right to a civil action, with de novo review of the matter. See 35 U.S.C. §
146.
178. See Charles E. Miller & Daniel P. Archibald, Interpretive Agency-Rulemaking vs. Statutory
District Court Review-Jurisdiction in Ex Parte Patent Reexaminations, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 498, 500 (2010) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.303(a), (d), and MPEP § 2279).
179. See Sigram Schindler Beteiligungsgesellschaft MBH v. Kappos, 675 F. Supp. 2d 629, 631–33
(E.D. Va. 2009) (noting tension between relevant statutory provisions governing judicial review).
180. See Miller & Archibald, supra note 178, at 524–29.
181. See, e.g., Power Integrations, Inc. v. Kappos, 6 F. Supp. 3d 11, 20–23 (D.D.C. 2013); see also
Teles AG v. Kappos, 846 F. Supp. 2d 102, 103 (D.D.C. 2012). But see Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin
GmbH, 271 F. Supp. 2d 64, 78 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The party that receives an adverse decision from the
PTO’s pending reexamination is not without redress . . . . When administrative remedies have been exhausted, that party may appeal to either this court or to the Federal Circuit.”) (emphasis added).
182. See generally Miller & Archibald, supra note 178 (arguing that properly read, the pre–AIA
Patent Act did not bar de novo rDistrict Court review of inter partes reexamination decisions).
183. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (codified in
relevant part in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318 (2006)) (repealed 2012).
184. Dolin, supra note 4, at 897.
185. See Dolin & Manta, supra 4, at 738.

2018

YES, THE PTAB IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

479

Federal Circuit,186 which in turn reviewed the PTO conclusions under a deferential standard.187 In this sense, inter partes reexamination looks no different from an IPR. At the same time, differences remain. Most importantly, in
the reexamination proceedings, the patentee retained an unlimited ability to
amend claims,188 which is a significant difference from litigation and sets the
proceedings apart from being simply a substitute for a trial in federal court.189
In this sense, the proceedings (like ex parte reexamination) were not adjudicatory in nature and did not trigger Article III’s strictures.190 More fundamentally though, the existence of inter partes reexamination which lasted
barely more than ten years and resulted in fewer than 500 cases of claim
cancellation191 is just as likely to be constitutionally suspect itself as to be
proof of the IPRs’ constitutionality. The fact that no Article III constitutional
challenges to inter partes reexamination materialized is just as likely to be
in consequence of the relative unimportance and rarity of the procedure as it
is to be the result of universal recognition of the procedure’s constitutionality.
At the end of the day, the IPRs are sufficiently and significantly different from their predecessor reexamination proceedings. The powers granted
to the PTAB by the America Invents Act combined with the lack of meaningful review in an Article III court, is also what sets IPRs apart and makes
them constitutionally suspect.
III.

WHY ARTICLE III?

The debate over where to repose adjudicatory authority is not merely an
academic exercise nor are the objections to the PTAB grounded in adherence
to supposedly formalistic, but ultimately irrelevant demands that judges have
life tenure and salary protection. Rather, the objection is grounded in the very
purposes of Article III itself and the failure and impossibility of the PTAB,
as presently configured, to live up to those goals.

186. 35 U.S.C. § 315 (2012).
187. See Flo Healthcare Sols., LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (applying
“substantial evidence” standard to a review of PTO’s determinations in an inter partes reexamination),
overruled on other grounds by Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
188. See Dolin & Manta, supra note 4, at 784–85.
189. Id.
190. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46 (2011) (“The Act converts inter partes reexamination
from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding.”).
191. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 1, (Sept. 30,
2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pdf (last
visited Mar. 25, 2018). There were fewer than 150 cases with claim cancellations prior to the passage of
the AIA, id. at 6, and fewer than 300 prior to the availability of the IPRs. Id. at 5.
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A. The Guarantee of a Neutral Adjudicator
The fundamental purpose of Article III is “to safeguard litigants’ ‘right
to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination
by other branches of government.’”192 The federal judiciary accomplishes
this goal by ensuring that Article III judges have life tenure and salary security.193 Once confirmed, a federal judge is entirely independent of the other
two branches and no amount of Presidential or Congressional fury at any
particular decision or approach to the law affects that judge’s or a collegial
court’s authority.194 It is just the opposite with the PTAB.
The PTAB judges serve as an extension and at the pleasure of the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office.195 The Director is ultimately responsible for the decisions of the Board and conversely, the Board makes the
decisions under the supervision of the Director.196 The Director himself is,
of course, a political appointee subject to Senate confirmation and serving at
the pleasure of the President197 (and under the direct supervision of the Secretary of Commerce, who is himself a political appointee).198 This setup
makes a fundamental difference in the security of the property rights in patents and neutrality in the adjudication of patent validity. To see why this is
so, one need look no further than the transition between President Obama’s
and President Trump’s Administration.
After President Trump’s inauguration, a number of individuals and
groups urged him to replace Director Michelle K. Lee with someone of his
own choosing. The president was lobbied to appoint someone with radically
different attitude toward IPRs than that espoused by former Director Lee.199
At the same time, the now-former Director Lee (or at least her policies) have

192. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (quoting United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).
193. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483–84 (2011).
194. See id. at 484.
195. See Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L. J. 470, 496 n.106 (2011) (citing 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(a) (2006)).
196. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent Stare
Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1587–88 (2016). The Director himself is a member of the PTAB and has the
power to select which other administrative patent judges hear which cases. 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2012).
197. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1), (4) (2002).
198. Id. at § 1(a) (The PTO is “an agency . . . within the Department of Commerce.”); § 3(a) (specifying that the Director of the PTO is also under the Secretary of Commerce).
199. See, e.g., James Edwards, The Bottom Line on Trump’s PTO: Michelle Lee Must Go,
IPWATCHDOG.COM (Jan. 24, 2017), http://bit.ly/2w8vNEA; see also Gene Quinn, President Trump Must
Pick a PTO Director Who Believes Patents are Private Property Rights, IPWATCHDOG.COM (June 28,
2017), http://bit.ly/2w7SKI5.

2018

YES, THE PTAB IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

481

their defenders in both the government and private sector.200 This tug-of-war
over who should run an important agency is, in and of itself, neither surprising nor noteworthy. As administrations change, so do policy goals and therefore personnel. In this regard, the PTO is no different from any other government agency. What is different though is that the arguments for change
in the PTO leadership were directly tied to the arguments for change in the
adjudicatory process in the IPRs. While changes in other agencies happen as
part of regular rulemaking process, subject to the Administrative Procedure
Act, apply globally to all those regulated by the relevant agencies, and perhaps most importantly do not change the scope of private property rights.
The changes in the leadership of the PTO, on the other hand, can affect private property rights in patents, can occur without any rule-making, and can
apply just to a selection of favored (or disfavored) patents. In other words,
an installation of a new Director can result in a complete about-face with
respect to a conclusion of validity (or invalidity) of any given patent simply
because the political winds have changed.
It is important to remember that the America Invents Act does not limit
the number of times the same patent can be subjected to an inter partes review.201 Nor is there a time limit on challenging a patent in an IPR. 202 The
opportunity for multiple reviews has been widely used, and some would say
abused.203 At the same time, a decision of one PTAB panel does not bind
another one and surviving one review provides no armor against subsequent
challenges.204 Given these parameters, it follows that a PTO director (or for
that matter a president) intent on invalidating a particular patent can continue
ordering more and more inter partes reviews until the desired outcome is
achieved. Under this system, a patent that may have survived review (and
litigation) during one presidential administration could be re-evaluated and
invalidated as soon as a new president is inaugurated and his choice for the
PTO Director is confirmed. Such a process can take place not because of any
200. See, e.g., Letter from Adobe Systems, Inc. et al. to Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S. (Apr.
25, 2017), http://bit.ly/2w8cGKX; see also Ashley Gold et al., Lee Staying on as Patent Chief under
Trump Administration, POLITICO (Jan. 19, 2017), http://politi.co/2w8xGRT.
201. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012) (limited estoppel provision); see also Cepheid v. Roche Molecular
Sys., Inc., IPR2015-00881, Paper No. 9, at 2, 5–8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 17, 2015) (instituting inter partes review after previous request by the same challenger was denied).
202. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c) (2012) (requiring that IPRs start nine month after patent issuance, but setting
no deadline for such filings).
203. See, e.g., Dolin, supra note 4, at 939–44. Some patents have been subject to in excess of 125
separate IPR petitions. Pedram Semeni, Patexia Chart 31: Can Patents Survive Multiple IPR Challenges?
(Case Study), PATEXIA (Mar. 8, 2017), http://bit.ly/2iGkosG.
204. Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Standard Operating Procedure 2 (Rev. 9), § VI.A (2014) (“Every
Board opinion is, by default, a routine opinion until it is designated as precedential or informative. . . . A
routine opinion is not binding authority.”).
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change in the substantive law, but merely because the political powers wish
to abrogate a particular patent. The scenario could work in reverse as well.
For example, in a situation where a patent is invalidated, the President could
remove the Director and have the new Director order a rehearing of the
PTAB’s decision which would then result in a contrary result.
The PTO Director’s ability to affect adjudication of specific patent
cases is not a mere participant in a law professor’s imagined “parade of horribles.” Rather, it is a description of actual facts on the ground. Thus, the
PTO Director has, on more than one occasion, when presented with a panel
decision of which she disapproved ordered new judges to be added to the
panel for the sole purpose of getting the PTAB to reach the “right” decision.205 One might think that such a procedure would be a little different from
(and therefore no more controversial than) a rehearing en banc in a circuit
court. But on closer inspection, the two procedures are entirely dissimilar.
When a Court of Appeals decides to rehear a case en banc, that decision is
taken by all non-recused judges of that court,206 all of whom later participate
in deciding the matter,207 and the issued opinion is binding on the whole court
unless overruled by the Supreme Court or another en banc decision.208 At the
PTAB, on the other hand, the decision to expand the panel is made unilaterally by the Director, the participating judges are those that the Director decides to assign to the task,209 and thus far, none of the expanded panels’ opinions have been designated precedential or even informative.210 Unlike the

205. See, e.g., Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co., IPR2015–00762, Paper
No. 12 (P.T.A.B. July 20, 2015) (2–1), rev’d on reh’g by expanded panel by, id., Paper No. 16 (Oct. 16,
2015) (3–2); see also Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp., IPR2014–00508, Paper Nos. 18, 20
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 20, 2014) (expanded, five-member panel) (3–2), rev’d on reh’g by, id. Paper Nos. 31, 32
(Feb. 12, 2015) (further expanded, seven-member panel) (4–3).
206. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
207. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2012). Even in the Ninth Circuit, where the en banc process involves merely
an “expanded panel” rather than all of the court’s judges, the judges are selected at random, precisely to
assure fairness to the litigants. See FED. R. APP. P. 35-3 (9th Cir.).
208. See United States v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218, 233 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 501
(2017); see alsop Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers
of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 649 (2017).
209. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2012) (“Each appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter
partes review shall be heard by at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, who shall be
designated by the Director.”); see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1531–32 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated
on other grounds by Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (“Commissioner [has] the authority to designate the members of a panel to consider a request for reconsideration of a Board decision. This includes,
as in this case, the Commissioner designating an expanded panel made up of the members of an original
panel, other members of the Board, and himself as such, to consider a request for reconsideration of a
decision rendered by that original panel.”).
210. For a list of PTAB’s precedential opinions, see Precedential Opinions, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/decisions-and-opinions/precedential (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). For a list of informative opinions, see Informative Opinions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-
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Courts of Appeal that use the en banc process to decide “question[s] of exceptional importance,”211 or resolve conflicts in the decisions of the court’s
panels,212 it appears that the PTAB uses expanded panels for the purpose of
reaching results favored by the Director in specific cases.213 And if the Director can order the Board to do that, so too can her bosses—the Secretary
of Commerce and the President. This is precisely the danger that the protections of Article III were meant to guard against.214 It is unfathomable that a
President could order the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit to rehear a case
en banc simply because he dislikes the outcome. But it is entirely within the
President’s prerogative to do so when the case is in front of the PTAB. This
ability almost ensures that “litigants ‘right to have claims decided before
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government’”215 is anything but safeguarded.
One might suggest that whatever overstepping of bounds that the PTAB
has engaged in during the early implementation of the America Invents Act
can be corrected by further legislation or rulemaking within the PTO. Thus,
one might concede that “panel stacking” and Director’s nearly unfettered
ability to order further IPRs are a problem, but that there are already some
limits on these authorities216 and that if needed, further ones can be implemented. From my perspective, though such additional limits would be welcome, they would not address the fundamental problem. True enough, the
system as it currently exists has some limits. For example, the PTO cannot
order inter partes reviews on its own and has to await a petition from a challenger prior to instituting proceedings.217 But it is not as if there is a shortage
of such challengers, including both competitors and “public interest” organizations.218 So this requirement hardly serves as a limitation on PTO’s ability
to convert a previous judgment of validity into one of invalidity or vice versa.
Similarly, while the statutory estoppels provisions and deadlines for seeking
process/appealing-patent-decisions/decisions-and-opinions/informative-opinions-0 (last visited Mar. 25,
2018).
211. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2).
212. Id. at 35(a)(1).
213. See Oral Argument, Yissum Research Dev. Co. of The Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Sony
Corp., 626 F. App'x 1006, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2015), http://www.717madisonplace.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/2015-1342-excerpt-7.mp3 (Attorney for the PTO conceding that “anytime there has been
a seeming other-outlier [the Director] engaged the power to reconfigure the panel.”).
214. See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.
215. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (quoting United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).
216. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)–(b), (e) (2014).
217. See supra notes 129–130.
218. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit A Run for Its Money: Challenging Patents
in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 292 (2015).
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IPRs for parties that have been sued for infringement somewhat lessen
(though without obviating) the opportunity for serial IPR abuse,219 they do
not address the constitutional concerns with the PTAB’s impartiality. The
America Invents Act-imposed limits on IPRs are merely statutory commands, and nothing in the logic supporting the constitutionality of the Act
would require that such limits be maintained. That is to say if adjudication
of patent validity can be assigned to an Article I tribunal, there is no reason
to believe that such assignment must be limited to situations where the patent
challenger is estopped from raising the same arguments in a subsequent petition or suit and, or, files his petition within only one year from being sued.
The constitutionality of the current post-issuance review system simply does
not depend on the statutory provisions limiting the scope or the timing of the
review.220 For the same reason, any additional limitations on the PTO’s discretion would not address the constitutional objection. The “purpose of Article III is to insure fairness to all litigants.”221 That guarantee cannot be dependent on mere legislative or executive promises not to put their thumb on
the scale. An Article I tribunal is fundamentally incapable of providing the
same safeguards to litigants that are taken for granted in Article III courts.
B. PTAB, Article III, and the Separation of Powers
As important as Article III’s role is in protecting impartial adjudication,
it has another role—safeguarding “the role of the independent judiciary
within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government.”222 It “serves a
structural purpose, ‘barring congressional attempts to transfer jurisdiction [to
non-Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating’ constitutional
courts and thereby prevent[ing] ‘the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other.’”223 Yet, the PTAB’s entire raison d’être
is to diminish the power of federal judiciary and expand the power of the
Executive Branch. And that goal has, in many ways, been accomplished.
The sponsors of the AIA were quite clear as to the purpose of the postissuance provisions. Thus, the House Judiciary Committee report that accompanied the bill declared that the post-issuance review is meant to “serve
219. See Dolin, supra note 4, at 939–44.
220. Cf. Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 534 (1877) (“If such a power exists, when does it cease?
There is no statute of limitations against the government; and if this right to reconsider and annul a patent
after it has once become perfect exists in the Executive Department, it can be exercised at any time,
however remote.”).
221. In re Earle Indus., Inc., 71 B.R. 919, 923 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
222. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (quoting Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agr. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985)).
223. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 (2015).
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as an effective and efficient alternative to often costly and protracted district
court litigation.”224 In the Senate, one of the AIA’s chief sponsors declared
that “[t]here really is no sense in allowing expensive litigation over patents
that are no longer valid.”225 The legislative history of the Act is replete with
statements evincing the desire to increase the powers of the PTO and decrease those of the federal judiciary in resolving patent disputes.226 And the
sponsors were successful on at least two levels.
First, as one commentator noted, PTAB’s “final written decisions invalidating [patent] claims [have] come to replace summary judgment and
post-trial decisions” rendered by Article III courts.227 The federal courts facilitated this takeover by overwhelmingly staying co-pending litigation
pending PTO review.228 This is not surprising as there is little reason to expend time and labor on a case that may disappear once the PTO issues its
final decision. As a result, federal courts have been essentially deprived of
their responsibility for adjudicating patent cases and determining the scope
of these property rights, while the role of the Executive Branch has been
correspondingly enlarged.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the PTAB has made judges (and
even Supreme Court justices) mere adjuncts and advisors to the PTO.229 The
opinions and judgments of Article III courts with respect to any given patent
are never settled and never final, because the PTO can always (applying
lower level of proof and a broader claim construction) cancel the patent in
inter partes review regardless of its success in front of any number of federal
judges.230 Thus, a patentee may file a suit for infringement, win it, obtain
either an injunction or ongoing royalty payment, win an appeal at the Federal
Circuit, and have that decision affirmed by the Supreme Court, only to see
the PTO invalidate the very same patent on the very same evidence,231 which
224. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 45 (2011).
225. 157 CONG. REC. S7413 (Nov. 14, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). Of course, patents are not
invalidated until there is a judgment of invalidity, so Senator Kyl’s statement is somewhat circular.
226. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21
FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 539, 600–01 (2012).
227. Craig E. Countryman, 2015 Patent Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 769,
833 (2016).
228. MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP 2017 PTAB DIGEST: THE LATEST TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS IN POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS 26 (2017), available at https://www.morganlewis.com//media/files/publication/report/ptab-post-grant-proceedings_fin_screen.ashx (showing that courts have
stayed co–pending litigation about 70% of the time).
229
. For a thorough discussion of how the PTAB undermines the ability of the judiciary to achieve
resolution of and finality in patent disputes see Brief of Prof. Dmitry Karshtedt as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Oil States, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (No. 16-1712), 2017 WL 3888204.
230. See Novartis AG v. Noven Pharm. Inc., 853 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“[P]rior decisions . . . d[o] not bind the PTAB.”).
231. See id.
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in turn would abrogate infringer’s duty to comply with the duties imposed
by judicial decree.232 In essence, the PTAB makes final “judgment[s] . . . inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party without a remedy.”233
Judicial determination of patent validity is now too often “merely an opinion,
which . . . remain[s] a dead letter, and without any operation upon the rights
of the parties, unless”234 reaffirmed by the PTAB during an inter partes review. As the Supreme Court said over 200 years ago, “[s]uch revision and
control [of judicial decisions is] radically inconsistent with the independence
of that judicial power which is vested in the courts.”235 This observation
ought to remain true even after the rise and maturation of the administrative
state.
IV.

THE PATH FORWARD

The AIA created post-issuance proceedings with three goals in mind:
“to decrease the cost of patent litigation, reduce the number of ‘dubious’ or
improperly granted patents, and increase the certainty of patent rights.”236 As
I have argued elsewhere, thus far, the reforms failed to accomplish any of
these goals, and likely exacerbated some problems.237 In light of that failure
and of constitutional infirmities discussed, one solution is simply abrogating
post-issuance review. But one need not throw out the baby with the bathwater in order to address the constitutional challenges or to achieve Congress’ goals. Nor does one need to forego the obvious expertise that the Patent Office has in patent matters. But in order to comply with the
Constitution, one must render unto Caesar that which is Caesar’s. A system
where the ultimate power to adjudicate patent validity resides, as it always
232. See Worden v. Searls, 121 U.S. 14 (1887) (holding that when a patent is invalidated, any injunction against violating the patent dissolves). But see Gugliuzza, supra note 4, at 299–302 (discussing
the Federal Circuit’s approach to a final judgment for past damages which the adjudged infringer appears
to be required to pay). Again, it is true that a defendant in a patent suit may not file an IPR petition more
than a year after having been sued, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012), and it is unlikely that the entire process
described above could be completed in a year. However, this is of no consequences. First, as discussed
above, the time limitation is a matter of statutory language and is not constitutionally compelled. Nothing
prevents Congress from changing the point at which the one-year countdown begins from the beginning
of the suit to the end of one. Second, the statutory deadline is quite porous in application. The PTAB has
consistently allowed out of time petitions to be joined to other, timely filed, petitions. It has done so even
when both the late and timely petitions are filed by the same entity. While it is within the power of the
PTO to limit these practices, once again, it is hard to fathom which constitutional provision would require
it to do so. In short, if the PTO can, consistent with the Constitution, exercise the powers it currently does,
nothing would appear to forbid it from exercising the same powers with even fewer restraints.
233. Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. 561, 561 (1864).
234. Id.
235. Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. 408, 410 (1792).
236. Dolin & Manta, supra note 4, at 721–22.
237. See generally Dolin, supra note 4 (critiquing AIA’s reforms for having imposed additional costs
and uncertainty while failing to live up to Congressional goals of the reform effort).
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has, in Article III courts, but where that power is exercised with reference to
the opinions of experts would be entirely permissible and perhaps laudable.
There are several options to accomplish the above goal. First, Congress
could restore de novo review of PTAB’s decision by civil action as had been
the case until 1999 with respect to all PTO’s decisions.238 Alternatively, Congress could limit availabilities of IPRs to those parties that have been sued
for infringement. Under such a system, the District Court would, on either
party’s motion, refer the matter to the Patent Office for its report and recommendation, much like it refers various matters to magistrate judges.239 An
unsatisfied party would then be able to note exceptions to the PTAB’s recommendations with the final decision resting with the District Court.240 An
added benefit of this system is that it would require the PTO to harmonize
its claim construction standards with those applicable in court, which would
in turn ensure consistency in the meaning of the claims both across various
fora and across different stages of litigation (i.e., validity and infringement).
With the courts maintaining ultimate control over the dispute, both the rights
of the litigants to an impartial adjudicator would be protected and the Judiciary’s power would not be diminished by the Executive’s actions.241
Furthermore, reforms are needed to ensure that judicial decrees are indeed final and not subject to revision by later PTO actions.242 Whether by
limiting PTO’s ability to institute an IPR for a patent which had survived
litigation through the appeal to the Federal Circuit or by making clear that
later cancellation of claims does not affect an earlier final judgment with
respect to an adjudged infringer, Congress must make sure that judicial decrees do not become little more than a starting point for future bargaining
over the fully adjudicated rights.
As a final matter, I should note that not all post-issuance review processes may need to be seriously reformed, for not all of them suffer from the
same infirmity. Post Grant Reviews (“PGRs”)243 are, in my view, fundamentally different from IPRs in a way which makes them stand on a more solid
constitutional footing and which may yet allow them to provide significant
benefits to the system. The most important difference between PGRs and
IPRs is the fact that the former is limited to the first nine months of a patent’s

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
914–19.

See supra notes 175177 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2012).
Id.
See supra notes 150, 151 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 228235 and accompanying text.
35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012). For a discussion on how PGRs operate, see Dolin, supra note 4, at
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life.244 The short time frame of availability of this procedure not only guards
against various abusive processes, but may also be of a constitutional significance. The Supreme Court has previously addressed a similar system where
land patents were concerned.245 Under the law at the time, the decision on
whether to grant a land patent was made by local registers and receivers, but
an appeal could be had to the Commissioner of the General Land-Office and
from there to the Secretary of the Interior.246 The land patent was not final
until the Secretary of the Interior rendered his decision or the time for filing
an appeal had expired.247 However, once that point was reached and
[T]he patent issued under the seal of the United States, and
signed by the President, is delivered to and accepted by the
party, the title of the government passe[d] with this delivery.
With the title passe[d] away all authority or control of the
Executive Department over the land, and over the title which
it has conveyed.248
In this sense, for at least some time, the rights an individual would receive under a land patent would be provisional and pending the decision of
the Secretary of the Interior or the expiration of time to seek such a decision.
At the same time, “one officer of the land office [was] not competent to cancel or annul the act of his predecessor. That [was viewed as] a judicial act,
and require[d] the judgment of a court.”249
By analogy then, an invention patent could be viewed as “subject to an
appeal to the” PTO Director, provided such appeal is taken in time. If it is,
then the Director’s judgment would be final (other than through judicial review), but if it is not, or if the Director affirms the initial grant, then the
authority of the Executive Branch over the matter would come to an end. The
constitutional standing of the PGR would be further enhanced if Congress
were to provide a right for a civil action to challenge patent cancellation in
that proceeding. Indeed, it makes little sense to allow an unsuccessful applicant to obtain District Court review of the PTO’s denial of the patent, though
that denial be finalized in a decision of the PTAB,250 but prohibit such review
244. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(c) (2014).
245. See, e.g., Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 531–33 (1877); see also Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S.
72, 86 (1871).
246. See Moore, 96 U.S. at 532–33.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 533.
249. United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. 525, 535 (1864).
250. 35 U.S.C. § 145. (2012).
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to a previously successful applicant whose patent was quickly abrogated by
a decision of the very same tribunal.251 PGRs, if properly done, have a potential to truly enhance the patent system by making sure that at least some
granting decisions are not made ex parte and on a limited record.252 This
would serve the Congressional goal of reducing the number of improperly
issued patents, and also strengthen those patents that survive the review,
which should, at least theoretically, lower the likelihood, and therefore the
cost of litigation.253
CONCLUSION
While the concern over spiraling cost of litigation in general, and patent
litigation in particular is understandable, and although the desire to improve
and strengthen the patent system is admirable, the solutions chosen by Congress to address these issues must be constitutional. Treating issued patents
as equivalent to other statutorily created rights is inconsistent with both the
history and nature of patents as well as Supreme Court precedents stretching
back over a century and a half. The America Invents Act failed to heed the
constitutional strictures in creating the Patent Trials and Appeals Board. The
result was not just bad policy perpetrated by a “patent death squad,” but a
system where the validity of patents is dependent on the executive branch’s
favor and benevolence towards patents and patentees. This system not only
fails to achieve the goals of AIA’s drafters of creating stronger and more
secure patent rights,254 but undermines the very foundation of the tripartite
system of government. At the same time, the system is not unsalvageable.
Congress can and should improve it in ways that restore the proper balance
between the Executive and the Judiciary branches, and also provide patentees and challengers with confidence in their respective rights in the adjudicator of those rights. Congress may wish to consider a number of changes to
the system so as to avoid various abuses, but in order to restore patents to
their rightful place and to protect our tripartite system of government, Congress must, at the very least, reestablish the courts’ ability for a de novo review of decisions regarding validity of an issued patent and preserve the inviolability of final judicial decrees.
251.
252.

Id. at § 329 (no right to pursue an appeal under § 145).
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 5, 7–10 (2003) (pointing out the inherent limitations
attendant to ex parte examination process), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf.
253. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 38–40. Of course, such gains would be for naught if the
IPRs continue as presently constituted. The efficacy of either process in achieving the goals Congress had
when it passed the AIA, however, is a topic for another paper.
254. Dolin, supra note 4, at 947–48.

